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NOTES AND COMMENTS
original date of sale;18 where the trustee gave a deed prematurely
the title derived was held valid since no injury was caused any interested party.1 9
In the instant case the clerk's exercise of discretion involves what
constitutes actual payment to him, not the time of payment. No
discretion exists to extend the time of payment laid down by the
statute. Neither should the rule laid down in the principal case be
extended to allow the clerk's authorization of mailing from an unreasonable distance, nor to allow his appointment of any unreasonable agency for delivery. Recognition must be given the strong
argument against the North Carolina policy of allowing advance
bids in that it tends to make judicial sales unstable, and chills the
bidding. 20 Granting that a liberal interpretation is consonant with
the purpose of the statute itself, in its effort to protect the mortgagor
by such liberality of construction the court should tak6 proper care
that it does not lean backward and thereby defeat its own purpose.

J. G. ADAmS, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Evidence--Parol Agreements to
Vary Liability of an Indorser
In Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton Mills, Inc.,' the payee of five
sealed notes brought action on them six years after maturity. The
defendants who were accommodation indorsers fdr the maker (now
insolvent) pleaded the three year statute of limitations. Plaintiff
offered oral evidence that defendants, directors of the corporation,
prior to their indorsement, agreed to "remain liable and responsible
until the notes were paid." Evidence excluded. Affirmed. Held:
that prior oral agreements which change the status of an indorser to
that of a surety are unenforceable. The court assumes that such an
agreement if held valid would impose the liability of co-makers or
sureties on the indorsers who could then plead only the ten year
statute of limitations for sealed notes.2
Lawrence
Beck,were
supra
note 11.
No advancev. bids
offered
during the statutory period, Wise v. Short,
supra note 11; but the clerk has no power to order a resale until an advance bid

has been made, where the clerk prematurely made order for deed to bidder the
order may be revoked and a resale ordered, Hanna v. Carolina Mortgage Co.,
197 N. C. 184, 148 S. E. 31 (1929).

"Hardy v. Coley, 114 Va. 570, 77 S. E. 458 (1913).
198 N. C. 89, 150 S. E. 676 (2) (1929).

'This point was not raised by either of counsel's briefs or by the court.

The plaintiff counsel sought to have the parol agreement enforced and thereby
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There may be room for doubt as to such assumption, but apart
from that question the case invites a discussion of the extremely important as well as interesting query: When will an extrinsic agreement between an indorser and another immediate party, which provides for a modification of the indorser's prima, facie liability be enforced in North Carolina? This problem can best be understood by
classifying the relevant North Carolina cases as follows: 1-Those
which held such agreements valid prior to the N. I. L. 2-Those
which held such agreements valid since the N. I. L. 3-Those which
held such agreements invalid since the N. I. L. As a forerunner to
this discussion it seems necessary to repeat the well-known rule that
extrinsic negotiations between the immediate parties, which modify
the indorser's liability are never enforced against a bona fide holder
in due course.3
1. Prior to the N. I. L. parol agreements were generally enforced in this state.4 It was then held that a person writing his
name on the back of the instrument before delivery to the payee was
presumed to be a co-maker, guarantor, or surety;5 but if his name
appeared after the payee's indorsement, the presumed liability was
that of an indorser. 6 In Mendenhall v. Davis7 the court enforced
the contemporaneous oral agreement that the blank indorsement was
to have no other effect than to assign the note to the payee. Other
contracts were held valid where the indorsee promised to strike out
the indorsement if the indorser deeded him a certain piece of land,8
and where the understanding was that the payee's indorsement was
to be a receipt to the indorsee as agent for the maker.9
bind the defendants on the extended notes, but the court very properly pointed
out that even if the agreement was valid there was no definite extension of
time.
'Hill v. Shields, 81 N. C. 250 (1879); (1915) 29 HAv. L. REV. 549; 1
DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1919) §707; N. I. L. §57.
"Lilly v. Baker, 88 N. C. 151 (1883) ; Love v. Wall, 8 N. C. 313 (1821);
Barden v. Hornthal, 151 N. C. 8, 65 S. E. 513 (1909) (where the notes sued
on were given about a month prior to the adoption of the N. I. L.; (1910)
23 HARV. L. REV. 396.

Barden v. Hornthal, supra note 4; cf. Gomez v. Lazarus, 16 N. C. 205
(1828).
6
Lilly v. Baker, supra note 4.
172 N. C. 150 (1875) (where the court said the indorsement constituted

no contract at all without the collateral oral agreement; see criticism of the
same in II WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §643 "such decisions nullify the
statute") ; cf. Comm's. v. Wasson, 82 N. C. 309 (1880).
'Smitherman v. Smith, 20 N. C. 86 (1838).
'Davis v. Morgan, 64 N. C. 570 (1870).
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2. Since the adoption of the N. I. L. by North Carolina, 10 one
writing his name on the back of an instrument before delivery to the
payee, is no longer presumed to be a co-maker or surety, for sections
63 and 64 provide that such a person is "deemed an indorser" and
is liable as such to the payee and all subsequent parties. Section 68
provides that successive indorsers shall be liable in the order of their
indorsements, but as among themselves, agreements to the contrary
will be enforced. Notwithstanding the express provisions of sections 63 and 64 our court continued to enforce extrinsic agreements
which varied the ordinary liability of an anomalous indorser to the
payee. 1 In Sykes v. Everett'2 the court enforced the oral agreement that the payee was to exhaust the resources of a certain estate
before proceeding against the defendant who had indorsed in blank.
The cases cited as authority were nearly all decided prior to the
adoption of the N. I. L. which was not cited. Likewise, in Fertilizer
Co. v. Eason'3 the court held valid the collateral agreement, entered
into at the time of the blank indorsement, that defendant would remain liable three or four years from the date of the indorsement,
which was a month after maturity of the note. The N. I. L. was not
cited. Both of these cases reviewed the early authorities, and repeated several times that "as between the immediate parties evidence
of parol agreements would be admissible, though it would not be
admissible against bona fide holders." The parol contract was held
valid in Lancaster v. Stanfield14 where defendant's name appeared
fifth in a list of twelve anomalous indorsers who had agreed to be
mutually liable as co-sureties. This case was correctly decided under
section 68 of the N. I. L., referred to above. It has been held in a
comparatively recent case' 5 that a parol contract between a surety
and an indorser that they would be equally liable was enforceable.
3. In other recent cases it was decided that parol agreements
imposing primary liability on an indorser are unenforceable. This
" N. C. Code Ann.
1927) ch. 58, §§2976-3171.
"XCf. McRae v. Fox,(Michie
185 N. C. 343,
117 S. E. 396 (1923), which proceeded
on the ground of mutual mistake but seems insupportable on that ground. The
case is criticised in (1923) 2 N. C. L. REV. 122, the writer of which said that
North Carolina had lined up with the minority in enforcing parol agreements
as between the immediate parties; Notes (1919) 4 A. L. R. 764; (1921) 11
A. L. R. 637; (1925) 37 A. L. R. 1222.

167 N. C. 600, 83 S. E. 585 (1914).

"194 N. C. 244, 139 S. E. 376 (1927).
"191 N. C. 340, 132 S. E. 21 (1926).
*Gilliam v. Walker, 189 N. C. 189, 126 S. E. 424 (1925).
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rule was first definitely established in Meyers Co. v. Battlel8 which
held that notice of dishonor was necessa Ty notwithstanding a collateral agreement that the indorser would assume the liability of an
"original promisor." A much later case Busbee v. Creech"7 was to
the same effect. By the language tenor of Wrenn v. Lawrence Cotton
Mills it seems that our rule has been extended; namely, so that no
collateral agreement which imposes primary liability on the indorser
will be enforced, whether its tendency is to dispense with the necessity
for the notice of dishonor or to repel the effect of the statute of
limitations. The court's careful consideration of the terms of the
N. I. L. in each of the later cases and the absence of that consideration in the earlier cases indicates the possibility that when the
proper occasion arises, the court may overrule Sykes v. Everett and
declare those parol agreements which limit the indorser's liability
also unenforceable.

J. B. LEwis.
Taxation-The Property Basis of Inheritance Taxation of
Intangibles-Inheritance Tax on Shares of NonResident at Corporate Domicile
The United States Supreme Court has recently decided in the
case of Farmers'Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota,1 that the State
of Minnesota cannot levy an inheritance tax upon the transfer of
bonds issued by that State and by its municipal corporations, owned
and held by a non-resident decedent. Such a radical departure from
the opposite rule as laid down in Blackstone v. Miller,2 affecting as
it does enormous interests, is of itself a landmark in the law of taxation. Its greater interest, however lies in the indication of a trend
in tax principles designed to relieve of the burdens of double taxation, and offering an avenue for a rationalization of the fundamental
conceptions of tax jurisdiction.
- 170 N. C. 168, 86 S. E. 1034 (1915) ; cf. Bank v. Wilson, 168 N. C. 557,
84 S. E. 866 (1915) where the same point was raised but expressly left unsettled.
192 N. C. 499, 135 S. E. 326 (1926) criticised in BIGELOW, BILLS, NoTEs
CHECKS (Lile 3 ed. 1928) §426, n. 7, as follows: "neither the reasoning
nor the result will likely be followed elsewhere." The learned author misinterpreted the facts to mean that the defendant indorsers were accommodating
the plaintiff. See also 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (1923) §§2443-2445; (1924) 38
Hiv. L. REV. 391; BRANNAN, NEGOTiALE INSTRUMENTs LAW (4th ed. 1926)
IT

AND

§§63-64.
'280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930). See Note (1930) 43 H{Av. L. REv.
792; (1930) 64 U. S. L. REy. 158.
2188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. ed. 439 (1902).

